India is presently investing in a sustained program of military modernisation. Some $40bn was earmarked for defence in the budget for 2012–13, with a significant proportion to be spent on new weapons. This year, according to SIPRI, India became the world’s biggest arms importer, and its long ‘wish list’—including fourth-generation fighters, heavy-lift aircraft, attack helicopters and main battle tanks—suggests that it will remain in that position for years to come.

These numbers, however, tell only part of the story. Some of this modernisation program involves upgrades to defensive capabilities, but not all. The mix also includes three new aircraft carriers (a refurbished Russian ship should eventually be delivered in early 2013, with two indigenous carriers soon to follow), nuclear submarines (a leased Russian Akula-II class boat plus a new Indian one) and air-to-air refuelling tankers (six soon to be ordered), as well as those multi-role combat aircraft, transports, helicopters and tanks. Many of these are systems designed more for power projection within and beyond India’s immediate region as well as for territorial defence.

In scale and spend, India is matching parts of China’s longer-running and more expensive modernisation program. In others areas—aircraft carriers and air-to-air refuelling, for example—India is arguably acquiring superior capabilities. Yet while China’s military modernisation is generally considered a cause for cause alarm, India’s program is not. Why?

One recent study by George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, Chinese and Indian Strategic Behaviour, gives a simple answer: when it comes to India, we’re fooling ourselves. They argue that there is an ‘India Threat’ to the security of the Indo-Pacific region on a par with that posed by China.

They also assert that India has much more in common with China than most Western observers think, including; a strategic culture that emphasises ‘veiled Realpolitik’, for instance, a telling history of using force to settle disputes, and a ‘preference for offensive military doctrine’. India’s strategic behaviour, they think, ought to generate the kind of ‘alarm’ that China’s does. They urge Westerners not to be distracted by the blandishments of ‘democratic peace theory’ or windy rhetoric about shared values, and suggest instead that they acknowledge the very real threat India might pose to regional stability.

Understandably, this argument has had a mixed reception in New Delhi. The highly-respected scholar Swaran Singh asserted in a prominent review in The Hindu newspaper that the book might speak with an ‘American voice’, but in a ‘Chinese accent’. In another review, the veteran strategist C. Raja Mohan expressed some doubts about the thesis, but thought it might have the positive effect of showing what Americans really think about India. Hopefully, Mohan argued, the book might shock sections of India’s elite into a more ‘pragmatic’ view of the strategic partnership with America and give it a better sense of the limits of that relationship.

Mohan’s point is apposite: the notion of an ‘India threat’ has emerged in a difficult stage in the ongoing rapprochement between India and the US. It hands ammunition to the many Indian critics of the strategic partnership, who argue vociferously that American foreign policy is exploitative and fickle, and that India is unwise to commit itself to that arrangement.

But the ‘India threat’ also contradicts most other assessments of India’s military modernisation and strategic intentions, including Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta’s excellent 2010 book Arming without Aiming . These assessments emphasise two points; first, that India remains a relatively weak military power and, second, that its strategic behaviour is characterised by restraint, even in the face of serious provocation. India is modernising from a low base and must import arms because its defence industries are mostly incapable of providing what it needs. And, as Cohen and Dasgupta show, India presently lacks both the will and the means to be more assertive in its own immediate neighbourhood or further afield. Ultimately, the ‘India threat’ rings hollow.

As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Bali bombing, there’ll be remembrance ceremonies, personal reflections, and the entirely justified acknowledgments of the successful law enforcement and security cooperation that emerged since 2002. But there has been limited public discussion on the ongoing threat that terrorism poses to both Indonesia and to Australia. While it’s relatively safe to assert that larger scale terrorist organisations such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have been substantially impacted by the dedicated and effective work of Indonesia’s counterterrorism professionals, this shouldn’t be equated with an end to the terrorist threat. While JI as an organisation is significantly diminished as a likely perpetrator of violent terrorism, the threat remains, and is likely to remain, a permanent aspect of the regional security landscape. As such, it’s worthwhile considering how and why the terrorism threat evolved in Indonesia in the first instance, and how this relates to both international developments and to the domestic situation here in Australia.

Much of the change in the nature of terrorism in Indonesia is reflective of the evolution that has occurred within Al Qaeda internationally. In part as a response to global counterterrorism efforts, but also as a conscious implementation of the strategic thought of terrorist theorists such as Abu Musab al-Suri (seen as an influential exponent of modern jihad), Al Qaeda, and its regional branches and affiliates have adopted an alternative structure and strategy. These changes are proving highly effective in ensuring the preservation of some form of operational capability, and in providing a resilient mechanism for the transmission of ideological propaganda as well as the communication of knowledge of terrorist tradecraft. What was once taught in training camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan is now delivered over the internet in video and audio files containing religious sermons, education in military theory, and practical instruction in how to assemble homemade explosive devices. Most online forums provide all this material in a range of languages, ensuring easy access to a wide variety of content. The global penetration and local relevance of AQAP’s Inspire magazine is reflected in a report by the International Crisis Group on Indonesian jihadism that noted that the first issue was immediately translated into Indonesian. In addition to the adoption of this method of education and communication, the global salafi-jihadist movement has also altered its military strategy.

The ongoing emergence of localised affiliates or franchises, each with differing relationships to Al Qaeda central, has made the terrorism threat more diverse and the movement more resilient. This process however, usually needs a conflict zone, a degree of instability or state weakness (or some combination of those) to gain traction. The secondary element, which has been evidenced in Indonesia, is individual jihad (jihad fardiyah), an idea explicitly advocated by al-Suri in his magnum opus, The Call to Global Islamic Resistance. This strategy involves the abandonment of hierarchical organisational structures and allows individuals and small groups to undertake relatively autonomous attacks without the need to seek authorisation from a centralised command structure. This notion has gained particular currency amongst the jihadist community in Indonesia, with divisions arising between those who subscribe to jihad fardiyah and those who remain wedded to the idea of jihad tanzim (organised jihad). Indonesia has witnessed a spate of these small-scale attacks that have often targeted individuals rather than larger scale symbolic targets. Sidney Jones makes reference in the ICG report to what is known as ightiyalat, or secret assassinations as the ‘preferred method of operation’ for terrorists in Indonesia. The relative ease with which a small cell or a ‘lone wolf’ can strike against an individual target is appealing to terrorists operating in an oppressive counterterrorism environment.

What this means is that the organisational structures haven’t disappeared, and in fact still play an important role in the preservation of jihadist terrorism in Indonesia, in much the same way as Al Qaeda central continues to play a role in the ongoing promotion and inspiration of global terrorism. Organisations such as JI continue to provide what are essentially networking opportunities for prospective terrorists, and attempt to build broader support for the political objectives of Indonesian terrorism. In this sense, the small cells and individual represent the vanguard of the movement, while the organisational elements create legitimacy and support. While their direct role in specific plots may be limited, they retain an important function in the broader process of terrorism in Indonesia.

Terrorism in Western jurisdictions has suffered parallel changes, with smaller scale attacks by individuals who have auto-radicalised via Internet video content or through reading copies of Inspire. In particular, the United States has seen a number of incidents involving individuals who have had limited contact with a traditional terrorist ‘organisation’ but have had sufficient communication with the virtual manifestation of Al Qaeda.

The conscious implementation of this strategy, as articulated by al-Suri, either as sophisticated strategy or as a response to the successes of global counterterrorism, means that the international community will continue to face an agile, difficult to detect, and resilient threat from terrorism. The single greatest challenge remains the survivability of the ideas and ideologies that underpin and justify global salafi-jihadist terrorism. Reflecting on the successes that have been achieved in the post-Bali era is important, but it should not be forgotten that there remains a diminished but perpetual threat.

The crimes of Osama bin Laden on 11 September 2001 had lasting, devastating strategic impacts. His death in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad will also have ripples across the international security landscape — and not all the effects will be benign.

For now, Americans and their friends around the world are variously rejoicing or relieved at the bloody end of this iconic adversary of the civilised world. It would seem a vindication of some aspects at least of the much maligned war on terror. It was fascinating to see President Obama rehabilitating some of his predecessor’s martial rhetoric in announcing a successful military operation on foreign soil.

But, perversely, the elimination of bin Laden at this time may turn out to be bad news for the people of Afghanistan.

For the moment, expect American self-confidence to be restored. Even Americans who were children when the Twin Towers fell — including many thousands in uniform — will feel there has been a proper reckoning. In an era of economic gloom and geostrategic uncertainty, where many pundits exaggerate America’s decline and China’s supposedly unstoppable ascendancy, there will be a willing audience for Obama’s boast that an act of patient vengeance proves that America can do anything.

Temporarily, all of this will be a shot of confidence to US and allied forces in their UN-mandated efforts to help Afghanistan provide for its own security. On the eve of the traditional summer fighting season, it is a much-needed morale boost.

It is proof that a decade of hard experience has taught America how to do counterterrorism of the most surgical kind. By all accounts, this was a painstakingly planned and well-executed mission, using intelligence from multiple sources to direct a helicopter-borne combat team.

The message to senior al Qaeda figures as well as the leadership of the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toiba is simple: wage war and you are safe nowhere.

Certainly, the Abbottabad operation and its rapid announcement by Washington was an exceptional public relations victory in a conflict where the terrorists almost always seem to have the initiative. For once, the website of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan — the Taliban’s propaganda vehicle — was slow with the news.

Yet there is a risk that these positive consequences will be short-lived. After all, American, Australian and other special forces in Afghanistan have long demonstrated their ability to target terrorist leaders.

In the longer run, the narrative that has propelled the war on terror and the Western presence in Afghanistan may now prove harder to sustain. With America’s defence budget under great strain, and a population weary of costly and strategically-questionable military commitments, the constituency for withdrawal from Afghanistan will now grow.

Political success in America thrives on symbolism and simple narratives. There will have been many Americans who accepted the cost of the Afghanistan conflict is worth paying in order to get bin Laden. Now that he is categorically gone, these voters will see American honour and credibility restored, and might be well satisfied with a military drawdown sooner rather than later.

Of course none of this means that the threat of terrorism has now diminished. The fugitive bin Laden has not been able to direct global terror operations for years. Instead, al Qaeda long ago shifted to a franchise model. Many attacks have been copycat operations by other groups or fanatical individuals. These days, Western agencies are deeply concerned about Lashkar-e-Toiba, the vicious organisation originally groomed by Pakistani intelligence to bleed India in Kashmir, but more recently reported to have been scouting targets in Europe.

Indeed, jihadists everywhere will now feel under pressure to strike back — to show that they are still in the game. They will claim bin Laden as martyr, one reason why President Obama was wise to emphasise that the man was a mass murderer of Muslims.

So, for the time being, there will be a heightened risk of attempted terrorist atrocities in many places. But these are unlikely to be well-planned, sophisticated attacks. They will be desperate deeds. Despite rumours of al Qaeda planning retaliatory ‘nuclear hell’, it is far from clear why insensate extremists in possession of an atomic bomb would not have used it long ago.

Still, there is every chance of continued terrorism within Pakistan. Whatever the truth about the complicity or otherwise of the Pakistani Government in the lethal American raid, the jihadists are bound to feel betrayed by the Pakistani military that they have sometimes seen as partner.

But it is the rest of the world that should be left deeply worried about the loyalties of the Pakistani security establishment. The fact is that Osama bin Laden had felt secure, for months or years, in a residential compound within earshot of Pakistan’s Military Academy, not some remote cave or village. His death confirms that all roads in the struggle against terrorism still lead to Pakistan.

This comment was originally published in The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy

The death of Osama Bin Laden will make no difference to global terrorism inspired by Islamic fundamentalism and will have scant impact on the war in Afghanistan.  Yet, it is the way that the US killed Osama Bin Laden that is cause for recognition; that is a precise, human intelligence-driven operation that must be employed ruthlessly in Afghanistan to capture or kill insurgent leaders as we enter another fighting season.

Al-Qaeda has not been about Osama bin Laden for quite some time and the Taliban in Afghanistan have not received support from al-Qaeda or Osama Bin Laden since the end of initial operations in 2001.  The global Islamic terrorist movement is now a leaderless Jihad and is more likely to come from a young IT whiz-kid in his bedroom in one of our leafy suburbs as it is from an old man hiding the mountains of AfPak border.

While it is a significant tactical victory for the United States, it will make no difference to the conflict in Afghanistan and the upcoming fighting season.  2010 was the most lethal year to date for civilians and Coalition forces and we never heard from Osama once.   The Taliban have not been guided or funded by al-Qaeda since the end of 2001.  The Taliban are not interested in achieving a global Caliphate.  They are focused on riding the villages and valleys across Afghanistan of foreign forces and imposing strict Sharia law on an ethnically diverse and tribally diffused mix of people.   There remains plenty of confusion even about the Taliban, let alone al-Qaeda.

Violence in Afghanistan is inflicted by several groups. There are the Pakistan-based foreign insurgents who are funded, fuelled and armed by a range of Middle Eastern sources.  They are a mixture of radicalised foreign extremists more interested in a one-way trip to Paradise than in the future of Afghanistan.  Many acts of violence, revenge and intimidation are blamed on the Taliban but are not always the work of the local Taliban.  More often, the various warlords, drug Barons and criminals wage horrendous violence on anyone who stands in their way. They also have no interest in peace and stability. They profit from the mayhem. Then there are the Haqqani and Hekmatyer networks, which are just as likely to shoot each other.

The local Taliban of course are the most parochial, isolated geographically, xenophobic and tribally bound – they are part of the social and tribal eco-system.  Our efforts need to be directed at this level by driving a wedge between them and any outsider than tries to re-establish Afghanistan as a safe haven for trans-national terrorism.

If you are being threatened of being killed or you need to feed the family then you are not going to care too much about Osama Bin Laden, dead or alive.   Osama Bin Laden or not continuing to kill, capture or negotiate with the local elements of Taliban will need to continue with the ferocity that the US Marines have shown in Helmand.    The proactive regimental commanders in Helmand have one rule: every fire fight will end with Marines “closing to zero”; that is, standing on the ground where the Taliban fired.  In Afghanistan negotiations ratify strength on the battlefield.  Removing the enemy protects the local population.  Until about 2009 we have relied more on money as a weapon than killing the bad-guys.  From President Karzai’s Government to the villagers, the response has been rational: take or steal every dollar the foreigners are foolish enough to give away.

The police and security mentoring being conducted by our Diggers in Uruzgon Province is not about removing al-Qaeda or even delivering peace.  Security equals the Afghan National Security Forces handling the violence on their own.  At present not a single District, let alone Province is under the sole protection of the Afghan Government.

What about the impact of Osama’s death on global terrorism?   Home grown terrorism is more the emerging threat across the Western world, not the founder of al-Qaeda.  Rather than struggling to infiltrate the United States or Australia and the intense security measures now in place, terrorism can be easily spread through sympathetic fanatics around the world, who if properly motivated, might stand a chance of achieving deadly results on their own.  Shortly after the London Underground bombings on 7 July 2005 it was revealed that the bombers were well educated, long terms UK residents and Citizens.  One of the most notorious terrorist coordinators for al-Qaeda was in fact Younis Tsouli, a.k.a Irhaby 007.  When British police bashed down his West London bedroom door in late 2005, they found a goofy-looking, long haired twenty-two year old student.  He was still hunched over his computer working on a website titled “YouBombit”.  His father was staggered at how his son could be involved with international terrorism since he never left his bedroom.

Osama Bin Laden may have been the mastermind behind some of the worst terrorist atrocities in modern history, but his legacy, combined with the tools of globalisation, is more dangerous than his physical presence on Earth.  International and national counterterrorism strategies will need to continue to be as innovative, determined and resourceful as the Tsouli’s of the world if they are to address a range of emerging asymmetrical threats, far beyond Osama Bin Laden.  As for Afghanistan, in the end success will not be something we either agree with or recognise.