Lord Palmerston said nearly 200 years ago that countries have no eternal allies or perpetual enemies, only eternal and perpetual interests. Whether or not this is true, one always looks in vain for consistency in the conduct of international relations. Burma-watchers have been reminded of this fact by the world’s decisive response to developments in Libya.

In February, the UN Security Council effectively invoked the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) doctrine to justify military intervention in Libya. The UNSC referred the Libyan case to the International Criminal Court and the UN Human Rights Council endorsed an International Commission of Inquiry. President Obama later stated that ‘left unchecked, we have every reason to believe that Gaddafi would commit atrocities against his own people. Many thousands could die’.

Burma activists were quick to ask why similar actions could not be taken against that country. After all, almost every criticism made of the Libyan regime could be levelled equally strongly at the military-dominated government in Naypyidaw.

Indeed, as one observer pointed out, ‘much of the language used in the [Libya] resolution has for many years featured almost word for word in UN General Assembly resolutions on Burma, and reports from the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma’.

According to opposition websites, people inside Burma watched in disbelief at how quickly the UN Secretary-General and Security Council acted after Qadhafi’s attacks on Libyan civilians. They contrasted this response with the consistent lack of international action to prevent military operations against unarmed demonstrators and ethnic minorities in Burma, which since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising have probably resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and forced hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighbouring countries.

Several commentators have since pointed out that the rare consensus in the UNSC supporting international action against Libya was most unlikely to be repeated in the event of a similar proposal to intervene in Burma. The political and strategic circumstances — China’s national interests in particular — are quite different. Nor would ASEAN endorse an armed attack against a fellow member. There are also questions over the feasibility of an extended multinational military operation against a country like Burma, particularly if it were opposed by regional countries.

Another critical difference between Libya and Burma — one that has been noted by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi — is that the Libyan armed forces are divided in their loyalties. Despite regime fears that the Middle Eastern ‘contagion’ might spread to Burma, prompting censorship of the protests in the local news media, there have been no signs that significant elements in the Burmese armed forces are ready to back the opposition movement and bring down the hybrid military/civilian government that was installed earlier this year.

Some Burma activist groups have condemned the uneven application of the R2P doctrine as blatant hypocrisy by Western countries devoted to their own narrow interests. Yet, there have always been inconsistencies in the Burma policies of both national governments and international organisations. For example, Burma is currently the target of wide-ranging sanctions that are aimed at few other countries, despite the fact that many — including a number in Asia — also have authoritarian regimes and long records of human rights abuses.

Such anomalies have rarely been questioned — at least not openly. In a recent Nelson Report, however (not online), Georgetown University’s David Steinberg asked why US sanctions against Burma are far harsher and more extensive than those levelled against North Korea. Pyongyang poses a much greater strategic threat to the US — and the wider world — than Naypyidaw. And the situation inside North Korea — in terms of undemocratic governance, human rights abuses, political prisoners, restrictions on civil society and economic mismanagement — are all far worse than in Burma.

There are good reasons for the US to be concerned about Burma, but singling it out for exemplary punishment seems to disprove Palmerston’s dictum. For, as US Senator Jim Webb in particular has argued, Burma still engages US national interests. It occupies a sensitive geostrategic position between the nuclear armed giants of India and China. It is a member of ASEAN and plays an important role in the management of several transnational problems. Burma has also developed a defence relationship with North Korea which probably includes ballistic missile sales and possibly even illicit transfers of nuclear technology.

Senior US officials have privately conceded that the main reason for the inconsistency in approach is Aung San Suu Kyi, whose influence on US policy makers has been profound. As Steinberg has also observed, had she not risen to global prominence and captured the popular imagination, it is likely that the US — and other Western countries — would have felt less constrained in considering a wider range of policy options towards Burma. As things currently stand, Washington is unlikely to make any significant changes to its Burma policy without first considering The Lady’s views.

All other considerations aside, this fact alone, that one albeit remarkable person can have such an effect on the foreign policy of the world’s most powerful country, underlines the futility of looking for consistency in the conduct of international relations.

This comment was originally published in The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy

The 37th G-8 Summit in Deauville, France, gave Russia an opportunity to strengthen its foothold in the Pacific, and not just through a final go-ahead of the Mistral amphibious ships deal, which has become a stumbling block in the past two months or so.

A week prior to the Summit, a high profile delegation of senior officials, including Vice Premier Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Economic Development Elvira Nabibullina and Minister for Transport Igor Levitin visited what Japan describes as the ‘disputed northern territories’.

The purpose of the visit was two-fold: to discuss near and long-term development strategy of the Kuril Island Chain, and to send a clear signal to Japan prior to G-8 meeting — Moscow has made up its mind about the future of the four disputed islands.

As expected, the visit caused an immediate knee-jerk reaction from Tokyo by formal expressions of regret that Russian officials have once again inspected the alleged Japanese territory. This was likely driven by both domestic motives (the need for the ruling party to appease conservative voters) and by regional foreign policy considerations.

Japan’s uncompromising stance with its neighbouring great power over a territorial dispute helps it to retain its regional status in times when another residual great power, the People’s Republic of China, has overtaken Japan as the world’s number two economy and is being rather tough with Tokyo on a number of matters.

What is becoming quite clear, however, is that Tokyo, being more and more preoccupied with the PRC’s rise, might ignore the obvious position of the Kremlin — the four islands of the southern sector of the Kuril Chain will remain under Russia’s control.

After years of sending mixed signals to Tokyo, President Medvedev’s Administration has established a final view regarding this long-standing bilateral dispute. In 2011 alone, the federal Government has committed 16 billion rubles (over US$571 million) to support infrastructure upgrades and improved living conditions for local communities.

Besides national prestige, Russia’s interest in the four islands is driven by both economic and military-strategic considerations. The economic value comes firstly from the potential of mining precious minerals such as rhenium and gold; deposits of the latter are estimated to be as high as 250 tons. Waters surrounding the Chain are also rich with fish stocks and other marine products.

The military-strategic value of the islands comes from their location. The chain, particularly its southern sector, acts as a defensive barrier to the maritime face of the Far East and the Sea of Okhotsk, an operational area for Russian ballistic missile submarines. Deep water channels between the southern islands are equally important, as they allow the flow of merchant marine and naval traffic (including submarine transfers) from Vladivostok to the open ocean.

Russia’s decision to upgrade its defensive posture around the Chain should send Tokyo another signal that the Russians have no intent to abandon their far eastern territories. Also, from the political-military viewpoint, Moscow continues to view Japan through the strategic prism of its balancing act against US military power in the Pacific.

Finally, for any decision-maker in Russia to make a territorial concession to Japan during parliamentary elections, which are being held in Russia this year, followed by next year’s presidential elections, would be committing political suicide, regardless of approval ratings or ruling party support.

Tokyo needs a reality check. The Yeltsin era bargaining game — ‘islands in exchange for investments’ — is over. No doubt, Russia needs massive foreign investment, particularly if it wants to shift its economy from being resource driven to high-tech powered. But strategic economic investment should not be mistaken for economic aid, which Moscow was desperately seeking throughout the troubled 1990s.

The Russians have a pragmatic understanding that Japan today needs them as much as they need it. Russia is playing a more and more visible role in meeting Japan’s energy requirements, an interdependence which will grow, post-Fukushima. Japanese companies are also moving their production to Russia: it is easier to nominate a Japanese car maker that does not have a production facility there.

The Japanese Government appears to lack a clear strategy on how to pursue its ‘northern territories’ agenda, which further weakens its stand in its discussions with Moscow. It would be surprising if many in Tokyo actually realise that returning the four islands is as feasible as seeing the US selling Alaska to back the Russians.

Perhaps the real value for Japan may come from having Russia on its side in its own balancing game against PRC. Recognising long-term strategic dividends over clearly unrealistic expectations that lead to dead-ends is the way forward.

This comment was originally published in The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy

Some of the reactions to the publication of my Policy Brief on Australian policy towards Fiji have confirmed my thinking that debate on the situation is Fiji is so polarised that rational discussion is almost impossible.

I don’t expect everyone involved in this debate to read my Policy Brief before commenting on my arguments, so this post presents a briefer version of the paper, for the purposes of clarification. I also take the opportunity to disclose my own bias, which reflects only my personal opinions and not those of the Lowy Institute.

Events of the last few days in Fiji, however, could change everything. Commodore Bainimarama has announced that former 3FIR Commanding Officer, Lt Colonel Ului Mara, who is facing charges of sedition (for an attempted move against Bainimarama) is now a fugitive, after he was assisted by the Tongan Navy to flee the country a few days ago.

Fiji’s chiefly ranks have long been reticent to oppose Bainimarama openly. The flight of Ului Mara, a member of Fiji’s most prominent chiefly families to Tonga, which shares ancestral links with many of Fiji’s chiefs, is the most significant sign yet that the tacit support Bainimarama has relied on from Fiji’s once powerful chiefs may be coming to an end.

I wrote in my Policy Brief that Bainimarama sought to eliminate or marginalise all potential sources of opposition (including the chiefly system) to secure his own future. His latest attempt to eliminate that opposition by charging Ului Mara with sedition may just have been a bridge too far for Fiji’s traditional leadership. But, as Sam often reminds me, predicting the future is a very unsafe task for researchers.

So, regarding my Policy Brief: for the record, I am not, nor have I ever been, a supporter of the Bainimarama regime or his roadmap for Fiji. My main concern, in my writings on The Interpreter and in a number of events the Lowy Institute has convened on Fiji, has been for the prosecution of effective Australian policy which supports the restoration of Fiji’s democracy, sustains Australia’s reputation for leadership in the Pacific, and maintains long-term people-to-people and economic relationships between Australia and Fiji.

In my Policy Brief, I argue that:

• Australian policy has failed to achieve its own goal in Fiji: to encourage a restoration to democracy.

• Bainimarama’s regime has formed other international partnerships which undermine the effectiveness of Australia’s approach.

• Australia’s regional leadership and international reputation is threatened by the entrenchment of the Bainimarama regime.

• Australia should develop a more effective policy that protects its long-term interests in Fiji and advocates democracy.

• Consistent with Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd’s statement that creative middle powers like Australia should work in coalitions with non-traditional partners to tackle old problems in new ways, I suggest that Australia should form a coalition with key allies and new partners such as Indonesia, India, Malaysia, South Korea and PNG and offer a package of assistance for constitutional and electoral reform in Fiji — as a means of putting pressure on Bainimarama to prove that he is committed to free and fair elections in 2014.

• To allow space for this new approach to work, Australia needs to break an impasse, and I suggest this could be done through increased dialogue between officials (which does not equate to appeasement) and through winding back sanctions to only apply to key members of the regime so that friends of Australia and supporters of democracy are not caught up in them.

• I don’t think my proposal is a guaranteed way to persuade Bainimarama to hold elections. While he may think twice before rejecting a multi-partner offer of assistance from Asian democracies he is keen to impress, the most likely outcome, supported by this poorly conceived comment from the Fiji Foreign Minister about Mr Rudd, is that he will reject it.

• I argue that this outcome will assist Australia to highlight Bainimarama’s intransigence and solidify crumbling international opinion against him. Countries which have wavered in their conviction that the Fiji regime is illegitimate, guilty of banning freedom of speech and perpetrating human rights abuses will be reminded by Bainimarama’s rejection of this offer that Bainimarama is not serious about democracy and intends to remain in power beyond 2014. A more united international approach that puts more pressure on Fiji might then have a more realistic chance of having an effect on Bainimarama.

• If, on the other hand, Bainimarama accepts the offer, I suggest Australia should offer Fiji some other measures which help future potential leaders of Fiji (outside the military) benefit from access to Australian and other leadership examples. None of these measures are designed to reward Bainimarama personally but would allow Australia to have some influence in a transition to democracy in Fiji and cultivate other leaders who have been marginalised by Bainimarama.

The people of Fiji are just as deserving of freedom as the people of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria. Australia’s current approach does little to help them achieve it and may even make it less likely by serving to entrench the Bainimarama regime.

A different approach from Canberra might help at least to expose the plight of the Fiji people to a wider international audience. It would also help to restore Australia’s reputation as a creative middle power.

This comment was originally published in The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy

I’ve just finished reading Ian Kershaw’s Fateful Choices. It’s a compelling analysis of ten decisions by war leaders in Britain, the US, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Japan during 1940 and 1941 (a comprehensive review here). It should be compulsory reading for statesmen, diplomats and generals in 21st century Asia.

This is not to draw clumsy parallels between the most devastating war in human history and the contemporary Asian security outlook. In particular, the extent of economic integration (reinforced by the absence so far of any serious lapse into protectionism following the global financial crisis) and the absence of serious ideological conflict distinguish 2011 from 1941. Nonetheless, Kershaw offers much food for thought.

Against the backdrop of today’s forecasts of China’s inexorable rise and of US decline, Kershaw does us the invaluable service of reminding us that history is fluid, messy and, crucially, shaped by the choices states make. He drills down to examine the other options available to each leader, the reasons they made the decision they did and the way their future options were shaped by previous choices — and also by the choices of other leaders.

By the time it is written, history looks like it was always going to turn out that way. But as my colleagues and I pointed out in Power and Choice, there is nothing preordained about Asia’s security future, good or bad.

Here are a few of the other insights I took away from Fateful Choices:

• It not international institutions but the interactions between great powers that shape the international order. Their choices define and circumscribe the choices available to lesser powers. Australia is experiencing this now, as we seek to balance our economic interests in a more assertive China with our security interests in the US alliance system.
• The importance of human agency — and in particular leadership — in accelerating, channeling or resisting historical forces and sometimes changing the course of events. There are many examples, but Churchill’s crucial rallying of British resolve in the early days of May 1940 is one stand-out (and the subject of another great book, John Lukacs’ Five Days in London).
• Democracies may not always act as decisively as authoritarian states. But they are less likely to make catastrophic strategic blunders and are better able to recover from errors. Much to Churchill’s frustration, isolationist sentiment constrained Roosevelt from bringing the US formally into the war against Germany until Hitler unwisely declared war on America after Pearl Harbor. By contrast, once Hitler and Japan’s elite resolved on expansion only total and disastrous defeat could turn their nations from that path.
• A tendency not to understand others’ choices and their implications for one’s own strategy. Hitler made his fatal decision to invade Russia in almost complete ignorance of the strategic intentions of Japan. Nor did he have any idea that the other member of the Tripartite Pact, Italy, was planning its ham-fisted attack on Greece, complicating Operation Barbarossa.
• Intelligence and good process can make a difference. Stalin had enough information to have known that Hitler was about to attack Russia and to take defensive measures. But his absolute power meant he was blinded to impending reality by overconfidence in his own judgment, which he bullied Soviet intelligence and military officers into sharing. By contrast, US code-breakers gave Roosevelt a good handle on Japan’s strategic intentions (albeit insufficient to avert Pearl Harbor).
• The choices a state makes today can radically constrain its future options. Stalin’s brutal purge of the Soviet officer corps in 1937 virtually decapitated the army when national survival would depend on it just four years later.

Worryingly, Kershaw’s book also reminds us that energy insecurity, mercantilism and competition for great power prestige lay at the heart of the war in the Pacific. On that occasion, the interaction of the great powers’ decisions produced a cataclysm.

Let’s hope the region’s statesmen make better choices this time round. An open international trading system, a healthy balance of power and freedom of navigation have to remain the foundations. More on that in due course from the Lowy Asia security team.

This comment was originally published in The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy