By now you’ve probably read that retiring US Defense Secretary Robert Gates had some stern words for European NATO members late last week:

In the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance:  Between members who specialize in “soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the “hard” combat missions.  Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or headquarters billets – but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.  This is no longer a hypothetical worry.  We are there today. And it is unacceptable.

Gates’ words are notable for being so blunt, but US presidents, defense secretaries and secretaries of state have been giving versions of this speech ever since Europe started cashing in on the post-Cold War peace dividend. And the reason European NATO members have for twenty years ignored these calls for greater sacrifice are right there in Gates’ speech.

On Libya, for instance, Gates says ‘the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country – yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the U.S., once more, to make up the difference.’ In other words, the US bailed out its under-resourced allies.

Then there’s this quote on America’s global military presence:

President Obama and I believe that despite the budget pressures, it would be a grave mistake for the U.S. to withdraw from its global responsibilities. And in Singapore last week, I outlined the many areas where U.S. defense engagement and investment in Asia was slated to grow further in coming years, even as America’s traditional allies in that region rightfully take on the role of full partners in their own defense.

Why would European NATO members feel under any pressure to take on a bigger role when the US seems so keen to do the job itself, and when they know the US will step in whenever Europe is caught short?

To be fair, the Americans have in some ways made good on their threats that they would not carry the NATO burden alone — US troop numbers in Europe have plummeted since the end of the Cold War. But it’s a measure of how secure European NATO members feel that this precipitous decline in the US military commitment to the continent has done nothing to change their defence spending habits. In fact the US is alone among NATO members in not substantially cutting its defence spending since the Soviet collapse.

Gates complains that European NATO members can barely sustain their modest operations in Afghanistan and Libya, and he reads this as a lack of will. But maybe European governments simply see the threat differently. They simply don’t regard these two operations as being important enough to their security to really do anything about them, beyond their current meager efforts.

This comment was originally published in The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy

Lord Palmerston said nearly 200 years ago that countries have no eternal allies or perpetual enemies, only eternal and perpetual interests. Whether or not this is true, one always looks in vain for consistency in the conduct of international relations. Burma-watchers have been reminded of this fact by the world’s decisive response to developments in Libya.

In February, the UN Security Council effectively invoked the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) doctrine to justify military intervention in Libya. The UNSC referred the Libyan case to the International Criminal Court and the UN Human Rights Council endorsed an International Commission of Inquiry. President Obama later stated that ‘left unchecked, we have every reason to believe that Gaddafi would commit atrocities against his own people. Many thousands could die’.

Burma activists were quick to ask why similar actions could not be taken against that country. After all, almost every criticism made of the Libyan regime could be levelled equally strongly at the military-dominated government in Naypyidaw.

Indeed, as one observer pointed out, ‘much of the language used in the [Libya] resolution has for many years featured almost word for word in UN General Assembly resolutions on Burma, and reports from the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma’.

According to opposition websites, people inside Burma watched in disbelief at how quickly the UN Secretary-General and Security Council acted after Qadhafi’s attacks on Libyan civilians. They contrasted this response with the consistent lack of international action to prevent military operations against unarmed demonstrators and ethnic minorities in Burma, which since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising have probably resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and forced hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighbouring countries.

Several commentators have since pointed out that the rare consensus in the UNSC supporting international action against Libya was most unlikely to be repeated in the event of a similar proposal to intervene in Burma. The political and strategic circumstances — China’s national interests in particular — are quite different. Nor would ASEAN endorse an armed attack against a fellow member. There are also questions over the feasibility of an extended multinational military operation against a country like Burma, particularly if it were opposed by regional countries.

Another critical difference between Libya and Burma — one that has been noted by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi — is that the Libyan armed forces are divided in their loyalties. Despite regime fears that the Middle Eastern ‘contagion’ might spread to Burma, prompting censorship of the protests in the local news media, there have been no signs that significant elements in the Burmese armed forces are ready to back the opposition movement and bring down the hybrid military/civilian government that was installed earlier this year.

Some Burma activist groups have condemned the uneven application of the R2P doctrine as blatant hypocrisy by Western countries devoted to their own narrow interests. Yet, there have always been inconsistencies in the Burma policies of both national governments and international organisations. For example, Burma is currently the target of wide-ranging sanctions that are aimed at few other countries, despite the fact that many — including a number in Asia — also have authoritarian regimes and long records of human rights abuses.

Such anomalies have rarely been questioned — at least not openly. In a recent Nelson Report, however (not online), Georgetown University’s David Steinberg asked why US sanctions against Burma are far harsher and more extensive than those levelled against North Korea. Pyongyang poses a much greater strategic threat to the US — and the wider world — than Naypyidaw. And the situation inside North Korea — in terms of undemocratic governance, human rights abuses, political prisoners, restrictions on civil society and economic mismanagement — are all far worse than in Burma.

There are good reasons for the US to be concerned about Burma, but singling it out for exemplary punishment seems to disprove Palmerston’s dictum. For, as US Senator Jim Webb in particular has argued, Burma still engages US national interests. It occupies a sensitive geostrategic position between the nuclear armed giants of India and China. It is a member of ASEAN and plays an important role in the management of several transnational problems. Burma has also developed a defence relationship with North Korea which probably includes ballistic missile sales and possibly even illicit transfers of nuclear technology.

Senior US officials have privately conceded that the main reason for the inconsistency in approach is Aung San Suu Kyi, whose influence on US policy makers has been profound. As Steinberg has also observed, had she not risen to global prominence and captured the popular imagination, it is likely that the US — and other Western countries — would have felt less constrained in considering a wider range of policy options towards Burma. As things currently stand, Washington is unlikely to make any significant changes to its Burma policy without first considering The Lady’s views.

All other considerations aside, this fact alone, that one albeit remarkable person can have such an effect on the foreign policy of the world’s most powerful country, underlines the futility of looking for consistency in the conduct of international relations.

This comment was originally published in The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy